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Abstract
We investigate the networks of committee and subcommittee assignments in the United States
House of Representatives from the 101st–108th Congresses, with the committees connected by
“interlocks” or common membership. We examine the community structure in these networks
using several methods, revealing strong links between certain committees as well as an intrinsic
hierarchical structure in the House as a whole. We identify structural changes, including additional
hierarchical levels and higher modularity, resulting from the 1994 election, in which the Republican
party earned majority status in the House for the first time in more than forty years. We also
combine our network approach with analysis of roll call votes using singular value decomposition
to uncover correlations between the political and organizational structure of House committees.
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PACS: 89.75.Fb, 89.65.-s, 89.75.-k, 07.05.Kf
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the detailed work in making United States law is performed by Congressional
committees and subcommittees. This contrasts with parliamentary democracies such as
Great Britain and Canada, in which a larger part of the legislative process is directly in
the hands of political parties or is conducted in sessions of the entire parliament. While
the legislation drafted by committees in the U.S. Congress is subject ultimately to roll
call votes by the full Senate and House of Representatives, the important role played by
committees and subcommittees makes the study of their formation and composition vital
to understanding the work of the American legislature.
The presence of committees in the House endows it with obvious hierarchical levels: in-
dividual Representatives, subcommittees, standing committees, and the entire House floor.
However, it is desirable to examine social networks in the House of Representatives quantita-
tively to determine whether it has any additional structure that might relate to collaborative
efforts among Representatives, such as correlations or close associations between the mem-
bers of different committees. The importance of such studies is not merely academic. An
understanding of the House as a collaboration network may shed considerable light on the
law-making process, as bills often spend time in several different committees and subcom-
mittees while being drafted in preparation for votes on the House floor. For instance, the
House’s consideration of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 involved the Committee on
Education and the Workforce, the Subcommittee on Education Reform, the Subcommit-
tee on 21st Century Competitiveness, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee
on Rules (setting the terms for the scrutiny of the bill) before being approved by the full
House [56]. After the Senate further amended the bill, a conference agreement eventually
passed both houses of Congress and the final bill was signed by the President to become
public law No. 107–110.
Analyzing the structure of the committee system in the House of Representatives and
studying its correlation with the partisanship of its constituent Representatives helps achieve
a better understanding of political party competition in Congress. Several contrasting
theories of committee assignment have been developed in the political science literature
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FIG. 1: (Color) Cumulative degree distributions of the 101st–108th U.S. House of Representatives
networks defined by committee and subcommittee assignments. (a) Fraction of Representatives
versus number of (sub)committee assignments. (b) Fraction of committees and subcommittees
versus number of assigned Representatives. In the 104th–108th Houses, all with Republican ma-
jorities, the cumulative degree distribution in (a) shifts farther up in each House and that in (b)
shows a similar but less pronounced shift. There is no noticeable trend in the Democrat-majority
101st–103rd Houses in (a), but it seems to shift up a bit in (b) to reveal a drift covering all eight
Congressional terms we studied.
(mostly through qualitative studies, although there have been some quantitative ones; see
[4, 9, 16, 29, 41, 52]), but there is no consensus explanation of how committee assignments
are initially determined or how they are modified from one two-year term of Congress to
the next. A question of particular interest is whether political parties assign committee
memberships essentially at random or if, for instance, one can show using objective analyses
that influential Congressional committees are “stacked” with partisan party members.
Our study of the organizational structure of Congress draws on network theory, which
provides powerful tools for representing and analyzing complex systems of connected agents.
While the quantitative study of real-world networks has a long history in the social sciences
(see, for example, the discussions in [33, 60]), such investigations experienced a major ex-
pansion in popularity in the late 1990s, in part because of interest in the Internet and online
networks. This increased attention has been especially evident in studies of large social, bi-
ological, and technological networks, which have relied on major advancements in computer
hardware and algorithms to generate novel results [1, 13, 33, 55, 60]. Among the myriad
topics that have been studied are evolving social groups [28], collaborations [19], community
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detection [11], and hierarchical organization [49, 51]. It is the modular and hierarchical com-
munity structure of networks that primarily concern us in our present study of Congressional
committee assignments.
The Congressional networks studied here are examples of collaboration networks, on
which there is a considerable body of previous literature. Networks constructed from collab-
orations between corporate boards of directors [30, 31, 32, 50, 59] are especially germane to
the present work, as such collaborations occupy a position in the business world somewhat
analogous to that of collaborations between Congressional committee members. Previous
studies have shown that board memberships play a major role in the spread of attitudes,
ideas, and practices through the corporate world, affecting investment strategies [21], polit-
ical donations [59], and even the stock market on which a company is listed [48]. Studies of
the structure of corporate networks have shed light on the mechanisms and pathways of in-
formation diffusion [6, 7, 12], and we believe that the structure of congressional committees
may turn out to be similarly revealing.
As we show here, network methods are particularly effective at uncovering structure
among committee and subcommittee assignments in Congress, without the need to incor-
porate any specific knowledge about committee members or their political positions. In a
recent article [47], the present authors formulated and briefly examined a number of com-
mittee assignment networks, looking, for instance, at the partisanship of the Select Com-
mittee on Homeland Security in the 107th House and its connections to other committees.
An alternative network perspective on the structure of Congress has been offered by J. H.
Fowler [14, 15], who examined the network defined by the cosponsorship of legislation by
Members of Congress. In the present work, we compare our previous observations to those
for the 108th House and explore the structural changes in the networks that resulted from
the 1994 Congressional elections in which the Republican party gained majority control of
the House. A detailed technical discussion of the methods used to obtain our results is
included in the appendices.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we define the bipartite collaboration networks
determined by the assignments of Representatives to House committees and subcommittees.
We then investigate the hierarchical and modular structure of these networks using several
different community detection methods. We also incorporate singular value decomposition
(SVD) analysis of House roll call votes into our study of the House’s community structure.
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We provide additional details in two appendices: in Appendix A, we explain the methods
used in our SVD analysis of voting patterns; in Appendix B, we give a detailed comparison
of several methods for community detection in networks, including our generalization of a
recently proposed local detection algorithm [3] to weighted networks.
II. COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT NETWORKS IN THE HOUSE
We represent each of the 101st–108th terms of the U.S. House of Representatives as a
separate bipartite (two-mode) network based on assignments of Representatives to com-
mittees and subcommittees (henceforth called just “committees” for simplicity). The two
types of nodes in these networks correspond to Representatives and committees, with edges
connecting each Representative to the committees on which he or she sits. The period we
study (1989–2004) spans the political changes following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 [56], as well as the 1994 elections in which the Republican party won majority
control of the House for the first time in more than forty years. We construct one network
for each two-year Congressional term from data published by the Clerk’s Office of the House
of Representatives [57], ignoring changes in committee assignments that occur while a term
is underway.
Each network includes roughly 440 Representatives (including non-voting Delegates and
midterm replacements), about 20 standing committees, and more than 100 subcommittees,
with an average of about 6 committee assignments per Representative. Because of the
relatively high edge density (about 5% of possible connections are present), some frequently
studied network statistics, such as geodesic path lengths, turn out to be unrevealing in this
case. Therefore, we instead focus our attention on the community structure of the networks
and associated measures such as modularity and Horton-Strahler numbers. We discuss these
analyses in Section III.
With data for eight consecutive Congresses, it is natural to ask how the committee
assignment network changes in time. One question of interest is whether the networks
contain signs of the so-called “Republican Revolution” of 1994 that ended forty years of
Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives, the longest span of single-party
rule in Congressional history [27]. That is, can one observe structural differences in the
committee assignment networks between the Democrat-majority Houses (101st–103rd) and
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Network of committees (squares) and subcommittees (circles) in the 107th
U.S. House of Representatives, with standing and select committees labeled. (Subcommittees tend
to be closely tied to their main committee and are therefore left unlabeled.) Each link between two
(sub)committees is assigned a strength (indicated by the link’s darkness) equal to the normalized
interlock. (The “interlock” between two committees is equal to the number of their common
members. The normalization takes committee sizes into account by dividing the raw interlock
by the expected number of common members if assignments were determined independently and
uniformly at random.) Thus, lines between pairs of circles or pairs of squares represent normalized
degree of joint membership between (sub)committees (it is because of this normalization that
lines between squares are typically very light), and lines between squares and circles represent the
fraction of standing committee members on subcommittees. This figure is drawn using a variant of
the Kamada-Kawai spring-embedding visualization, which takes link strengths into account [25].
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FIG. 3: (Color) Another visualization of the committee assignment network, with standing com-
mittees labeled. This plot is color-coded according to the mean “extremism” (defined in the text;
see Appendix A for details) of each committee’s constituents, where red nodes are more extreme
and blue ones are less extreme. Thus, the redder committee are composed of ideologues from both
parties and the bluer ones consist of moderates. The strength (darkness) of the link between two
committees is equal to their interlock (which is not normalized here). Observe that similar groups
of committees are clustered together in this plot as in Fig. 2, despite the different definition of link
strengths. (This figure is also drawn using a variant of the Kamada-Kawai spring embedder.)
the Republican-majority ones (104th–108th)? As one means of addressing this question, we
compute the degree of each node, defined as the number of edges connected to it. Because
the committee assignment networks are bipartite, we construct two types of cumulative
(integrated) degree distributions [40] and examine how they changed across Congresses.
One distribution (Fig. 1a) indicates the number of committees on which each Representative
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FIG. 4: (Color) Network of committees (squares) and subcommittees (circles) in the 108th
U.S. House of Representatives, color-coded by the parent standing and select committees. (The
depicted labels indicate the parent committee of each group but do not identify the location of
that committee in the plot.) As with Fig. 2, this visualization was produced using a variant of the
Kamada-Kawai spring embedder, with link strengths (again indicated by darkness) determined by
normalized interlocks. Observe again that subcommittees of the same parent committee are closely
connected to each other.
sits, and the other (Fig. 1b) gives the number of Representatives on each committee. We
do not observe a significant trend in Democrat-majority Houses, although a slow increase in
committee sizes is revealed in Fig. 1b. The committee reorganization that accompanied the
formation of the Republican-majority 104th House, however, produced a sharp decline in
the typical numbers of committee and subcommittee assignments per Representative, but
the trend in subsequent Republican-majority Congresses has been a slow increase in both
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FIG. 5: (Color) Dendrogram representing the hierarchical clustering of the committees in the 107th
U.S. House of Representatives, determined by single linkage clustering of normalized committee
interlocks. Each committee is color-coded according to the mean “extremism” of its members
(defined in the main text; see Appendix A), from less extreme (blue) to more extreme (red).
The clusters at each level are color-coded according to the average of their constituent committee
extremism scores.
the numbers of assignments and the committee sizes. These trends are visible in Fig. 1.
While rich in their data content, the two-mode networks of committee assignments are
difficult to visualize and interpret. A common strategy in such cases is to examine instead
a one-mode “projection” of the network onto either the committees or the Representatives.
In our studies, we have made considerable use of the projection onto the committees, in
which a network is created whose nodes represent the committees and whose edges represent
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common membership or “interlocks” between committees. Figures 2 and 3 show two different
visualizations of the network of committees for the 107th House of Representatives (2001–
2002), an example that we analyze in some depth below.
We quantify the strength of a connection between committees in this projected network
with a normalized interlock, defined as the number of common members two committees
have divided by the expected number of common members if membership of committees of
the same size were randomly and independently chosen from Congressmen in the House.
Committees with as many common members as expected by chance have normalized inter-
lock 1, those with twice as many have interlock 2, those with none have interlock 0, and
so forth. We use this weighting in the visualization of the network of the 107th House in
Fig. 2 by darkening the links between nodes accordingly [61]. As a comparison, we also
show a visualization based on the raw (unnormalized) interlock count of common members
in Fig. 3. In Fig. 4, we depict the 108th House using normalized interlock.
Some of the connections depicted in Figs. 2–4 are unsurprising. For instance, sets of
subcommittees of the same standing committee typically share many of the same members,
thereby forming a group or clique in the network. The four subcommittees of the 107th
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for example, each include at least half of the
full 20-member committee and at least one third of each of the other subcommittees. These
tight connections result in normalized interlocks with values in the range 14.4–23.6, causing
these five nodes to be drawn close together in the visualizations, forming the small pentagon
in the middle right of Fig. 2 and lower right of Fig. 3. The Intelligence Committee and its
subcommittees are also tightly connected in the 108th House, appearing again as a small
pentagon in Fig. 4.
Some connections between committees, however, are less obvious. For instance, the 9-
member Select Committee on Homeland Security, formed in June 2002 during the 107th
Congress in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 [26], has a strong
connection to the 13-member Rules Committee (with a normalized interlock of 7.4 from two
common members), which is the committee charged with deciding the rules and order of
business under which legislation is considered by other committees and the full House [56].
The Homeland Security Committee is also connected to the 7-member Legislative and Bud-
get Process Subcommittee of Rules by the same two common members (with normalized
interlock 13.7). In the 108th Congress (see Fig. 4), the Homeland Security Committee
10
swelled to 50 members but maintained a close association with the Rules Committee (with
a normalized interlock of 4.1 from 6 common members).
III. THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF COMMITTEES
We now turn to an examination of community structure in the networks of committees
based on the one-mode projection described above. We do this using several methods of
hierarchical clustering, in which one begins with a network and ends up (by construction)
with a hierarchical (tree) structure. In this section, we discuss the hierarchical clustering
method known as single linkage clustering [24]. We found similar results using several
alternative community detection methods, which are discussed in detail in Appendix B.
For each of these methods, we quantify the organizational structures we find using Horton-
Strahler numbers (to indicate the number of hierarchical levels) and modularity (to indicate
the compartmentalization into different groups).
To implement single linkage clustering, we start with the complete set of committees for
a given Congress. We then join committees sequentially starting with the pair with the
greatest normalized interlock, followed by the next greatest, and so forth. This process
generates “clusters” of committees, which can be represented using a tree or dendrogram,
such as that shown in Fig. 5 for the 107th House. Closer examination of the dendrograms in
Fig. 5 (from the 107th Congress) and Fig. 6 (from the 108th Congress), each of which has a
Horton-Strahler number of 5, conveys four reasonably-expected and well-ordered hierarchical
levels of clustering: subcommittees, standing and select committees, groups of standing
and select committees, and the entire House. These single linkage clustering dendrograms
also give some suggestion of a weaker fifth level of organization corresponding to groups of
subcommittees inside larger standing committees.
In this paper, we are primarily interested in the organizational levels describing the con-
nections between standing and select committees (and groups thereof). For example, near
the 8 o’clock position in Fig. 5 (from the 107th Congress) is a tightly grouped cluster that
includes the House Rules Committee, the House Administration Committee, and the Se-
lect Committee on Homeland Security. A similar cluster appears in Fig. 6 (from the 108th
Congress) near the 3 o’clock position, including all five of the subcommittees of Home-
land Security introduced in the 108th Congress. Because assignments to select committees
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FIG. 6: (Color) Dendrogram of the 108th House, determined by single linkage clustering and color-
coded according to the Horton-Strahler values [22, 54] of its leaves (discussed in the text), with
lower values in blue and higher values in red. The ties between Rules and Homeland Security
persist (between the 3 o’clock and 4 o’clock positions), despite the swelling in size of the latter
committee to fifty members. As discussed in Appendix B, these ties are robust with respect to the
algorithm used to determine the hierarchy.
are ordinarily determined by drawing selectively from committees and subcommittees with
overlapping jurisdiction, one might naively expect a close connection between the Select
Committee on Homeland Security and, for example, the Terrorism and Homeland Security
Subcommittee of the Intelligence Select Committee, which was formed originally as a bipar-
tisan “working group” and was designated on September 13, 2001 by Speaker of the House
Dennis Hastert [R-IL] as the lead congressional entity assigned to investigate the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks [26]. However, the 107th Homeland Security Committee shares only one common
member (normalized interlock 2.4) with the Intelligence Select Committee (located near the
1 o’clock position in Fig. 5) and has no interlock at all with any of the four Intelligence
subcommittees.
As shown in Figure 5, we can enrich the analysis by color-coding each committee according
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to the mean “extremism” of its members. Extremism is determined using the results of a
singular value decomposition analysis of Representatives’ voting records that places each
Representative on a scale that runs, roughly speaking, from the most partisan Republican
members of the House to the most partisan Democrats (the SVD analysis is described in
detail in Appendix A). The extremism of a committee is then quantified as the average
deviation of its members from the mean on this scale. Committees composed of highly
partisan members of either party appear in red in Fig. 5 and those containing more moderate
Representatives appear in blue. Taking again the examples of Intelligence and Homeland
Security, we can immediately identify the former as moderate and the latter as more partisan.
Indeed, the Select Committee on Homeland Security has a larger mean extremism than any
of the 19 standing Committees and has the 4th largest mean extremism among the 113
committees of the 107th House (see Table I). This is perhaps not so surprising when we see
that its members included the House Majority Leader, Richard Armey [R-TX], and both the
Majority and Minority Whips, Tom DeLay [R-TX] and Nancy Pelosi [D-CA]. However, our
characterization of the committee was made mathematically, using no political knowledge
beyond the roll call votes of the 107th House. As another example, the 107th House Rules
Committee is the second most extreme of the 19 standing committees (after Judiciary) and
ranks 18th out of 113 committees overall. In contrast, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the 107th House has a smaller mean extremism than each of the 19 standing
Committees, and Intelligence and its four subcommittees all rank among the 10 least extreme
of all 113 committees.
IV. MODULARITY
To further investigate the observed hierarchies in the House committee assignment net-
works, we employ the statistic known as modularity, modified to allow for the weighted
nature of our networks. Consider first an unweighted network, which is divided into some
number of groups of vertices. The modularity m for this division into groups is defined to
be [35]
m =
∑
i
(eii − a2i ) , (1)
where eij denotes the fraction of ends of edges in group i for which the other end of the
edge lies in group j and ai =
∑
j eij is the fraction of all ends of edges that lie in group i.
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Most Extreme Committees Most/Least Extreme Committees and Subcommittees
Select Committee on Homeland Security 1. Commercial and Administrative Law (Judiciary)
Judiciary 2. Forests and Forest Health (Resources)
Rules 3.Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security (Judiciary)
Standards of Official Conduct 4. Select Committee on Homeland Security
Resources 5. Africa (International Relations)
Budget 6. Workforce Protections (Education and the Workforce)
Education and the Workforce 7. Judiciary
Ways and Means 8. Social Security (Ways and Means)
International Relations 9. Labor, Health and Human Services and Education (Appropriations)
Small Business 10. The Constitution (Judiciary)
House Administration
Appropriations 113. District of Columbia (Government Reform)
Energy and Commerce 112. Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence (Intelligence)
Financial Services 111. Intelligence Policy and National Security (Intelligence)
Government Reform 110. Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency
Armed Services Management (Transportation and Infrastructure)
Veterans’ Affairs 109. Technology and Procurement Policy (Government Reform)
Science 108. Technical and Tactical Intelligence (Intelligence)
Transportation and Infrastructure 107. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Agriculture 106. General Farm Commodities and Risk Management (Agriculture)
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 105. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
(Transportation and Infrastructure)
104. Terrorism and Homeland Security (Intelligence)
TABLE I: SVD rank ordering of the committees in the 107th House. In the first column, we list the
standing and select committees from most extreme to least extreme. In the second column, we list
the most extreme and least extreme committees and subcommittees, with the parent committee
shown in parentheses when appropriate. (The latter set of committees is listed from less extreme
to more extreme.)
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Modularity measures the difference between the total fraction of edges that fall within—
rather than between—groups (the first term) and the fraction one would expect if edges
were placed at random (respecting vertex degrees). Thus, high values of the modularity
indicate partitions of the network in which more of the edges fall within groups than one
would expect by chance. This, in turn, has been found to be a good indicator of functional
network divisions in many cases [37].
The projected one-mode networks we consider here are weighted. In our calculations,
we therefore employ the weighted generalization of modularity described in [34], in which
instead of counting numbers of edges falling between particular groups, we count the sums
of the weights of those edges, so that heavily weighted edges contribute more than lightly
weighted ones. Both eij and ai can be generalized in this fashion in a straightforward manner,
and then the modularity is again calculated from Eq. (1). The meaning of the modularity
remains essentially the same: it measures when a particular division of the network has more
edge weight within groups than one would expect on the basis of chance.
We use modularity to quantify the organizational divisions of the networks and to compare
the dendrograms to each other. In particular, the modularity values shown in Table II indi-
cate that the dendrograms produced via single linkage clustering have a better-defined com-
munity structure (higher modularity) in the Republican-controlled Houses (104th–108th)
than in the Democrat-controlled ones. Hence, with respect to the metric of normalized inter-
lock, the committee reorganization following the Republican Revolution (which we already
saw in Fig. 1a produced a sharp decline in the typical numbers of committee assignments
per Representative compared to the 101st–103rd Houses) seems also to have tightened the
compartmentalization of the House committee assignments.
V. NUMBER OF HIERARCHICAL LEVELS
Another interesting feature of dendrograms is the depth of their hierarchical organization,
which can be quantified by computing Horton-Strahler numbers [2, 10, 22, 54].[62] As orig-
inally defined, Horton-Strahler numbers give the number of levels in the minimum-depth
branch of a tree. Here we consider two generalizations. First, we examine the Strahler
numbers of leaves (see, for example, Fig. 6), assigning a value Sj that identifies the number
of hierarchical levels associated with the jth subcommittee; this is the number of levels in
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Method: SL EB NB WL
M1 , M˜1 0.1666 , 0.1037 0.1450 , 0.0904 0.1775 , 0.0964 0.3388 , 0.1945
M2 , M˜2 0.1831 , 0.0923 0.1552 , 0.0855 0.1693 , 0.0979 0.3395 , 0.1675
M3 , M˜3 0.1824 , 0.0975 0.2640 , 0.1388 0.2385 , 0.1308 0.3884 , 0.2343
M4 , M˜4 0.4221 , 0.2077 0.2987 , 0.1542 0.3312 , 0.1909 0.4432 , 0.2614
M5 , M˜5 0.3331 , 0.1681 0.2518 , 0.1290 0.2439 , 0.1600 0.3945 , 0.2228
M6 , M˜6 0.2982 , 0.1709 0.2481 , 0.1305 0.2420 , 0.1581 0.3720 , 0.1861
M7 , M˜7 0.3350 , 0.1755 0.2604 , 0.1293 0.2386 , 0.1465 0.3748 , 0.2133
M8 , M˜8 0.3324 , 0.1736 0.2319 , 0.1178 0.2294 , 0.1417 0.3781 , 0.2204
TABLE II: Maximum (Mi) and average (M˜i) modularities of community structure for committee
assignment networks for the 101st–108th House of Representatives, with dendrograms produced
using single linkage clustering (SL), random-walk betweenness with sequential edge (committee
assignment) removal (EB), random-walk betweenness with sequential Representative node removal
(NB), and a generalization of the local community detection algorithm of [3] to weighted networks
(WL). These last three algorithms are described in Appendix B. For the WL method, we use the
value of the local clustering threshold parameter α giving the greatest maximum modularity (see
Appendix B).
the particular branch of the tree with that specific subcommittee as the leaf. In Table VIII
of Appendix B, we compare S = maxj Sj, the mean S˜ = 〈Sj〉, and the standard deviation
σ = 〈(Sj − S˜)2〉1/2 in the 101st–108th Houses for single linkage clustering, two betweenness-
based dendrograms, and our local community detection method to quantify the statistics of
the hierarchical levels revealed by each method. Second, we also define a notion of Strahler
numbers for communities (see Fig. 7), in which a given subtree (i.e., community) is assigned
a Strahler number as if it were itself a full dendrogram.
As indicated previously, single linkage clustering identifies several hierarchical levels of
organization within the House of Representatives: subcommittees, committees, and the floor
(the whole House). In all eight Houses, we also identify a fourth hierarchical level, represent-
ing groups of closely-connected committees. In the 104th, 105th, 107th, and 108th Houses,
single linkage clustering reveals a fifth level of organization. See, for example, Fig. 6, which
is color-coded according to the Sj values of the leaves/committees, and Fig. 7, which is
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color-coded according to the Horton-Strahler S values computed as if each community were
itself an individual tree. Single linkage clustering appears to organize the House’s hierar-
chical structure more sharply than betweenness-based dendrograms, as the trees produced
by the former have consistently higher values of S and S˜. Additionally, networks with high
maximum and average Strahler numbers tend also to have high modularity scores (compare
Tables II and VIII), signifying their strong organizational structure.
Strahler numbers reveal additional information about the changes in the House committee
assignment networks after the Republican Revolution. The three lowest mean Strahler values
occur in the Democrat-majority Houses (101st–103rd), despite the fact that the number of
committees and subcommittees decreased after the Republicans gained control of the House
(see Fig. 1). In a perfectly balanced binary tree, one would instead expect an increase in
the Strahler number when nodes are added. Furthermore, all of the Republican-controlled
Houses except the 106th have five levels of hierarchical structure (based on the metric of
Strahler numbers) rather than the four revealed in the 101st–103rd Houses, so it seems that
the change in majority party added an extra level of hierarchical structure to the committee
assignment network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have applied methods from network theory, coupled with an SVD analysis of roll call
votes, to investigate the organizational structure of the committees and subcommittees of
the U.S. House of Representatives. Using the 101st–108th Congresses as examples, we have
found evidence of several levels of hierarchy within the network of committees and—without
incorporating any knowledge of political events or positions—identified some close connec-
tions between committees, such as that between the House Rules Committee and the Select
Committee on Homeland Security in the 107th and 108th Congresses. We have also iden-
tified correlations between committee assignments and Representatives’ political positions
and examined changes in the network structure across different Congresses, emphasizing ef-
fects that resulted from the shift in majority control from Democrats to Republicans starting
with the 104th House.
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APPENDIX A: VOTING PATTERNS
In this appendix, we analyze the voting records of Representatives. The results of this
analysis were used in the main text to investigate the relationship between the network of in-
terlocks linking the Congressional committees and the political positions of their constituent
Representatives.
One way to characterize political positions is to tabulate individuals’ voting records on
selected key issues (via, for example, interest group ratings), but such a method is subjective
by nature and a procedure that involves less personal judgment is preferable. Here we apply
the “multi-dimensional scaling” technique known as singular value decomposition (SVD) [18,
53] to the complete voting records of each session of the House [45, 46]. Each two-year term
of Congress is treated in isolation from the others. Other methods of analysis [23, 42], such as
the Bayesian approach of [8], also yield useful results. The advantages of multi-dimensional
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scaling techniques versus factor analysis (which has a long tradition in political science) in
analyzing voting data are discussed in detail in [5].
We define an n×m voting matrix B with one row for each of the n Representatives in the
House and one column for each of the m votes taken during a two-year term. For instance,
the 107th House had n = 444 Representatives (including midterm replacements) and took
m = 990 roll call votes. The element Bij is +1 if Representative i voted “yea” on measure j
and −1 if he or she voted “nay.” If a Representative did not vote because of absence or
abstention, the corresponding element is 0. (We do not separately identify abstentions from
absences; additionally, a relatively low number of false zeroes is generated by resignations
and midterm replacements.)
The SVD identifies groups of Representatives who voted in a similar fashion on many
measures. The grouping that has the largest mean-square overlap with the actual groups
voting for or against each measure is given by the leading (normalized) eigenvector u(1) of
the matrix BTB, the next largest by the second eigenvector u(2), and so on [18, 53]. If
we denote by σ2k the corresponding eigenvalues (which are provably non-negative) and by
v(k) the normalized eigenvectors of BBT (which have the same eigenvalues), then it can be
shown that
Bij =
n∑
k=1
σku
(k)
i v
(k)
j , (A1)
where σk ≥ 0 for all k. The matrix B(r), r < n, with elements
B
(r)
ij =
r∑
k=1
σku
(k)
i v
(k)
j (A2)
approximates the full voting matrix B. The sum of the squares of the errors in the elements
is equal to
∑n
k=r+1 σ
2
k, which vanishes in the limit r → n. Assuming the quantities σk, called
the singular values, are ordered such that σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ σ3 . . ., this implies that B(r) is a good
approximation to the original voting matrix provided the singular values decay sufficiently
rapidly with increasing k. Alternatively, one can say that the lth term in the singular value
decomposition (A1) accounts for a fraction σ2l /
∑n
k=1 σ
2
k of the sum of the squares of the
elements in the voting matrix.
To an excellent approximation, we find that a Representative’s voting record can be char-
acterized by just two coordinates. That is, B
(2)
ij is a good approximation to Bij . Observing
that one of the two directions correlates well with party affiliation for members of the two
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major parties, we call this the “partisan” coordinate. We call the other direction the “bi-
partisan” coordinate, as it correlates well with how often a Representative votes with the
majority. Because Senators are generally better known than Representatives, we plot as an
example the coordinates along these first two eigenvectors for the 107th Senate in Fig. 8a.
As expected, Democrats are grouped together and are almost completely separated from
Republicans. For ease of identification, we follow the sign convention that places Democrats
on the left and Republicans on the right. The few instances of apparent party misiden-
tification by the partisan coordinate in Fig. 8 are unsurprising. Conservative Democrats,
such as Zell Miller [D-GA], appear farther to the right than some moderate Republicans [4].
Additionally, Senator James Jeffords [I-VT], who left the Republican party to become an
Independent early in the 107th Congress, appears closer to the Democratic group than the
Republican one and to the left of several of the more conservative Democrats. (He appears
twice in Fig. 8a, once each for votes cast under his two different affiliations.)
One can use a truncation of the SVD to construct an approximation to the votes in the full
roll call [53]. For instance, with our two-dimensional approximation to the voting matrix, we
assign “yea” or “nay” votes to individuals based on the signs of the corresponding elements
of the matrix. In Fig. 8b, we show the fraction of actual votes correctly reconstructed
by this approximation, which gives a measure of the “predictability” of the Senators in
the 107th Congress. For both parties, moderate Senators are less predictable than hard-
liners. The two-dimensional projection correctly reconstructs the votes of some hard-line
Senators for as many as 97% of the votes they cast. Examining the apparent outliers in
Fig. 8b, the votes Senator Jeffords cast as a Republican appear here to make him the least
“predictable” Senator. However, it is important to emphasize that Jeffords cast relatively
few votes as a member of the Republican party, so it is not surprising that this behavior is
less predictable because the voting record includes a large number of artificial absences. The
other Independent in Fig. 8b is Senator Dean Barkley [I-MN], who completed the remainder
of the term for Senator Paul Wellstone [D-MN] in the 107th Congress after Wellstone’s
death. While one might be tempted to interpret Barkley’s partisan coordinate as balanced,
its value is strongly influenced by the large number of effective absences in the SVD analysis
because he was not appointed until very late in the term. Both of his first two coordinates
consequently lie near zero. The other apparent outliers in Fig. 8b—Senators Russ Feingold
[D-WI] and John McCain [R-AZ]—are both known for their occasional “maverick” behavior.
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Congress 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
101st 40.0 20.4 3.0 1.7 1.5 1.1
102nd 39.6 20.1 2.8 1.8 1.2 1.0
103rd 43.1 21.5 2.9 1.6 1.3 0.9
104th 47.1 19.1 2.7 1.6 1.3 0.7
105th 38.6 28.7 2.0 1.5 1.2 0.9
106th 40.0 29.5 1.9 1.6 1.2 0.9
107th 45.3 29.6 1.6 1.4 1.0 0.7
TABLE III: Amount of voting information, measured as the percentage of the variance of the voting
matrix, encoded by the six leading eigenvectors of the 101st–107th House voting matrices. The
first column indicates the Congress, and the next six columns give the percentage of information
encoded by each of the six leading eigenvectors.
Having demonstrated the application of SVD to the analysis of the voting records of the
Senate, let us now return to the House of Representatives. For the 107th House, we find that
the leading eigenvector accounts for about 45.3% of the variance of the voting matrix, the
second eigenvector accounts for about 29.6%, and no other eigenvector accounts for more
than 1.6%. We obtain similar results for other recent Congresses, with two eigenvectors
giving a good approximation to the voting matrix in every case (see Table III). In Fig. 9,
we plot these two coordinates for every member of the House of Representatives for each
of the 102nd–107th Congresses. It has been shown previously using other methods that
Congressional voting positions are well-approximated by just two coordinates [44, 45], but
it is important to emphasize that different identification methods treat the “bipartisan”
direction differently. In particular, some methods eliminate it entirely and associate the
two remaining dimensions with partisanship and an additional direction often identified as
a North-South axis, which was historically important during periods of heightened concern
about civil rights [44, 45]. The SVD analysis here keeps the “bipartisan” coordinate, making
identifications in a particularly simple fashion straight from the voting matrix containing
the roll call data.
As with the Senate, we find that the leading eigenvector corresponds closely to the ac-
knowledged political party affiliation of the Representatives, with Democrats (blue) on the
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left and Republicans (red) on the right in the plots [63]. Representatives who score highly on
this “partisan” coordinate—either positively or negatively—tend often to vote with mem-
bers of their own party. From this coordinate, we also compute a measure of “extremism”
for each Representative as the absolute value of their partisan coordinate relative to the
mean partisan score of the full House. That is, we define the extremism ei of a Representa-
tive by ei = |pi − µ|, where pi is the Representative’s partisanship score and µ is the mean
value (usually skewed slightly towards the majority party) of that coordinate for the entire
House. In Table IV, we list the most and least partisan Representatives from each party (as
computed from the roll call) for the 107th House.
By contrast, the second eigenvector groups essentially all Representatives together regard-
less of party affiliation and thus appears to represent voting actions in which most members
of the House either approve or disapprove of a motion simultaneously. Representatives who
score highly on this “bipartisan coordinate” tend to often vote with the majority of the
House.
The mean extremism for the Representatives in the 107th House is about 0.0458, and
the standard deviation is σ ≃ 0.0090. The extremism of committees as averages over their
constituent members yields a distribution of mean 0.0456 and standard deviation 0.0032.
By contrast, one might crudely expect the standard deviation of the committees’ extremism
to be approximately σ/
√
N , where N is the average number of Representatives per com-
mittee. For the 107th House, this gives 0.0090/
√
21.87 ≃ 0.0019. Hence, the distribution of
committee extremism is roughly 50% wider than what would be expected with independent
committee assignments. Basic statistics concerning committee extremism for the 101st–
107th Houses are summarized in Table V. Observe, for example, that the relative variance
versus that expected from random committee and subcommittee assignments increases with
every Congress (with the largest increase occurring between the 106th and 107th Houses).
Using the SVD results, we can also calculate the positions of the votes (as opposed to
the voters) along the same two leading dimensions to quantify the nature of the issues
being decided. We show this projection for the 107th House in Fig. 10. One application
of this analysis is a measurement of the reproducibility of individual votes and outcomes.
Reconstituting the voting matrix as before using only the information contained in the
two leading singular values and the corresponding eigenvectors and summing the resulting
approximated votes over all Representatives, we derive a single score for each vote. Making
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Least Partisan Farthest Left Farthest Right
K. Lucas [R] J. D. Schakowsky [D] T. G. Tancredo [R]
C. A. Morella [R] J. P. McGovern [D] J. B. Shadegg [R]
R. M. Hall [D] H. L. Solis [D] J. Ryun [R]
R. Shows [D] L. C. Woolsey [D] B. Schaffer [R]
G. Taylor [R] J. F. Tierney [D] P. Sessions [R]
C. W. Stenholm [D] S. Farr [D] S. Johnson [R]
R. E. Cramer [D] N. Pelosi [D] B. D. Kerns [R]
V. H. Goode [R] E. J. Markey [D] P. M. Crane [R]
C. John [D] J. W. Olver [D] W. T. Akin [R]
C. C. Peterson [D] L. Roybal-Allard [D] J. D. Hayworth [R]
TABLE IV: SVD rank ordering of the most and least partisan Representatives in the 107th
U.S. House. The first column gives the least partisan Representatives, as determined by an SVD of
the roll call votes. The second column gives the SVD rank ordering of the most partisan Represen-
tatives. They are all Democrats (the mean partisanship is skewed slightly towards the Republican
party because it held the majority), so this also ranks the Representatives farthest to the Left.
The third column gives the rank ordering of the Representatives farthest to the Right.
a simple assignment of “pass” to those votes that have a positive score and “fail” to all
others successfully reconstructs the outcome of 984 of the 990 total votes (i.e., about 99.4%
of them). Overall, 735 (about 74.2%) of the votes passed, so simply guessing that every
vote passed would be considerably less effective. Ignoring values from known absences and
abstentions (i.e., zeroes in the original voting matrix), the analysis still identifies 975 of
the 990 results correctly. Even with the most conservative measure of the reconstruction
success rate—in which we ignore values associated with abstentions and absences, assign
individual yeas or nays according to the sign of the matrix elements, and then observe which
outcome has a majority in the resulting roll call—the two-dimensional reconstruction still
identifies 939 (about 94.8%) of the outcomes correctly. We repeated these calculations for the
101st–106th Houses and found similar results in each case (see Table VI). The remarkable
accuracy of SVDs in reconstructing votes was previously observed for U.S. Supreme Court
cases in [53]. The Optimal Classification (OC) technique of [46] (see also [44]) also generates
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House µR , VarR µC , VarC µS , VarS 〈C〉 ∆(VarC) 〈S〉 ∆(VarS)
101st 0.0252 , 0.000167 0.0248 , 1.458× 10−5 0.0251 , 1.454× 10−5 16.755 0.984 27.091 1.357
102nd 0.0335 , 0.000210 0.0335 , 1.540× 10−5 0.0343 , 9.818× 10−6 17.632 0.856 37.773 1.403
103rd 0.0423 , 0.000194 0.0425 , 1.544× 10−5 0.0429 , 9.014× 10−6 18.206 0.959 39.091 1.410
104th 0.0431 , 0.000171 0.0430 , 1.262× 10−5 0.0435 , 7.830× 10−6 19.774 1.080 40.842 1.397
105th 0.0340 , 0.000108 0.0339 , 8.927× 10−6 0.0345 , 6.059× 10−6 20.056 1.169 41.526 1.651
106th 0.0455 , 0.000128 0.0455 , 1.298× 10−5 0.0462 , 5.686× 10−6 20.944 1.472 42.474 1.330
107th 0.0458 , 8.080× 10−5 0.0456 , 1.008× 10−5 0.0461 , 4.358× 10−6 21.867 1.927 43.368 1.625
TABLE V: Committee extremism statistics for the 101st–107th Houses. The first column indicates
the Congress. The second gives the mean and variance of the extremism of the Representatives in
that Congress. The third and fourth columns give the mean and variance under the independence
assumption of, respectively, all the committees and only the standing committees (without select
committees). The fifth column gives the average committee size, and the sixth gives how much
larger the variance of committee extremism is than would be expected under an independence
assumption (as reported in column three). That is, the variance of the committees’ extremism
is this factor multiplied by the variance expected if Representatives were assigned to committees
independently at random. The seventh and eighth columns repeat these numbers for standing
committees (compare with column four).
a rank ordering of the Representatives in the 107th House and correctly classifies 92.8% of
the individual Representatives’ votes.
In making the connection between the voting record and committee assignment net-
works, we remark that we constructed the committee assignment networks representing the
101st–107th Houses from documents obtained from the website of the U. S. House of Rep-
resentatives Office of the Clerk [57], which were based on the committee assignments at the
end of each Congress. The roll calls, by contrast, include votes from Representatives who
subsequently died or resigned and hence were not present at the end of the session. Our net-
works also include Representatives (such as non-voting Delegates) who do not appear in the
voting record. To combine the network structures with the political spectra (as determined
using the SVD analysis), it was thus necessary to reconcile the two data sets by removing a
few Representatives in each of these categories (about 5–10 from each roll call and 5–10 from
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Congress Number of votes Outcomes correctly reconstructed % Individual votes reconstructed
101st 879 867, 864, 848 87.6 %
102nd 901 892, 888, 850 87.6 %
103rd 1094 1075, 1072, 1021 88.9 %
104th 1321 1307, 1312, 1225 89.3 %
105th 1166 1157, 1164, 1079 89.7 %
106th 1209 1200, 1198, 1121 90.6 %
107th 990 984, 975, 939 92.7 %
TABLE VI: Roll call outcome reconstruction in the 101st–107th House of Representatives using
two-coordinate projections of SVDs. The first column gives the Congress, and the second indicates
the total number of measures in their roll call. In the third column, we show consecutively the
number of outcomes correctly identified from the unmodified reconstruction, the number correctly
identified throwing out known absences and abstentions, and the number correctly identified throw-
ing out absences and abstentions and then reconstructing individual Representatives’ yeas/nays
and taking a majority vote. In the fourth column, we show the percentage of individual votes
correctly reconstructed (which we note increases slightly from one Congress to the next during this
time period).
each network). In situations where we have incorporated political spectra into our network
analysis, it is always with this slightly abridged set of Representatives. The subsequent SVD
computations show little change as a result of these adjustments.
APPENDIX B: COMMUNITY DETECTION ALGORITHMS
The results in the main text of this paper use single linkage clustering to determine the
community structure of the network of committees, but several other methods can also be
used (see, for example, [11, 17] and references therein). It is of interest to ask whether
our results are robust with respect to changes in the method employed. To address this
question, we have explored three other methods: two based on “betweenness” measures
calculated on the full bipartite networks of Representatives and committees and a local
community detection algorithm for weighted networks, generalized from the method for
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unweighted networks introduced in [3]. As we now describe, we obtain similar groupings with
these different algorithms, although with some differences, suggesting that the large-scale
features (but perhaps not the details) observed in our single-linkage clustering calculations
are fundamental properties of the networks and not a result of our choice of methodology.
1. Betweenness-based community detection
Communities can be detected in many cases using “betweenness” measures that itera-
tively pick out and remove high-traffic edges (or other network components) that lie on a
large number of paths between vertices. Repeated application of such a procedure eventually
fragments a network into components, with the entire process represented by dendrograms
similar to those generated by standard hierarchical clustering [17, 38, 39].
We have performed a corresponding calculation modified slightly to respect the bipartite
nature of the committee assignment networks, for which betweenness can be computed
by counting the number of shortest paths between pairs of committees that traverse each
edge in the network. Additionally, we compute betweenness from densities of random walks
between committees rather than from geodesics (see [36]), in part because the small diameter
of the network often leads to many non-unique geodesics. We use this betweenness measure
in two different algorithms. In one, we sequentially remove those edges (i.e., committee
assignments) with highest betweenness. In the other, we sequentially remove the nodes
(i.e., Representatives) lying on the largest number of paths. Applying these two methods to
the full (unweighted) bipartite committee assignment graphs avoids altogether the projection
onto a one-mode network and the definition of the normalized interlock used in single linkage
clustering.
Comparing the different community detection schemes, we see that the dendrogram for
the 107th House determined from random-walk betweenness and edge removal (see Fig. 11)
shows four levels of hierarchical organization and again reveals the tight connections between
the Rules Committee (and its subcommittees) and the Select Committee on Homeland Se-
curity. We also again observe the close ties between the Intelligence Committee and its sub-
committees. However, other connections seemingly apparent in the single linkage clustering
dendrogram are not uncovered by this betweenness-based method. Some subcommittees are
not even grouped with their parent committee; for example, near the 6 o’clock and 7 o’clock
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positions, we see a weakly grouped cluster of committees that includes (consecutively) the
Forests and Forest Health Subcommittee of the Resources Committee, the Select Education
Subcommittee of the Education and the Workforce Committee, and the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee of the International Relations Committee.
Strahler numbers provide a way to quantify the robustness of some of these different
groupings. The dendrogram representing the community structure of the 107th House de-
termined by random-walk edge removal has a Strahler number S = 4. Its average Strahler
number of S˜ ≃ 2.7788 quantifies the fact that many committees break off as singletons.
However, the portion with the Rules Committee and Select Committee on Homeland Secu-
rity has a value of 3. This grouping therefore gives meaningful organizational information
(in that it refers to an actual clique in the network), even though the tree as a whole does
not show a tremendous amount of hierarchical structure.
2. Weighted Local Community Detection
We have also constructed dendrograms from the one-mode committee networks using a
local community-detection algorithm generalized from a method for unweighted networks
developed by Bagrow and Bollt [3]. The goal of this algorithm is to find a highly connected
set of nodes (a “local community”) near each node and to combine these individual (poten-
tially overlapping) communities for each node into a hierarchical community structure. We
again use the network of committees weighted by normalized interlocks that we considered
for single linkage clustering.
To detect communities, we start with a given House’s (one-mode) adjacency matrix A,
whose element Aij gives the normalized interlock between the ith and jth committees. For
convenience, we further normalize these elements by the maximum normalized interlock, so
that 0 ≤ Aij ≤ 1. We use these weights as inverse distances to compute a distance matrix D,
where the element Dij designates the shortest distance along any path from the ith node
to the jth node. We then define a clustering coefficient k of a selected group of n nodes
as the sum of all weights within that group divided by 1
2
n(n − 1). In our generalization of
the algorithm in [3], we define the d-shell of node i to be all nodes within distance d of i
according to the distance matrix. We identify the local community of the ith node to be the
largest d-shell of node i with k ≥ α for some threshold α. As α is increased, the definition
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of a local community becomes more stringent and smaller cliques are obtained.
Using a “membership matrix” that encodes this combined information (see Fig. 12),
we manipulate the resulting collection of local communities to produce dendrograms (this
procedure is described in Ref. [3]). An unsorted membership matrix N collects the ensemble
of information about the local communities of each node as originally ordered in the data.
Because each subcommittee is listed with its parent committee in the data ordering, this
unsorted membership matrix (Fig. 12a) is already nearly block partitioned. The jth element
of the ith row has the value 1 if node j is part of i’s community and the value 0 if not. We
compare the values in two rows (i and k) and define a distance ∆ between them according
to the number of times they differ:
∆(i, l) = n−
n∑
l=1
δ(Nil, Nkl) , (B1)
where δ is 1 if Nil = Nkl and 0 if not. As discussed in Ref. [3], we then compute a sorted
membership matrix N˜ as follows: (1) compute the distance ∆(i, l) for all rows l > i; (2)
swap the row i + 1 with the row i∆ that has the smallest distance to row i (equivalent to
interchanging vertex labels, so columns i and i∆ must also be swapped); (3) repeat steps
1 and 2 for row i + 1 and continue until there are no remaining rows to consider. Well-
separated communities in N˜ appear as blocks along the diagonal, and their imperfections
indicate possible substructure [compare panels (a) and (b) of Fig. 12].
We obtain well-structured dendrograms over a wide range of values of the local cluster-
ing threshold parameter α and again observe the close connections between the Rules and
Homeland Security committees in the 107th House (see, for example, the 7 o’clock position
in Fig. 7). These ties between the Rules and Homeland Security committees are evident even
for values of α for which some of the other groupings in the dendrogram have disappeared,
again indicating the strength of their connection.
One can depict the network’s communities (and how strongly they are connected to each
other) at a given level of organization using pie charts (which provide a coarse-graining of
the network reminiscent of the “cartographic” visualization of networks discussed in [20]).
For example, Fig. 13 shows such a pie chart for the 107th House, with each pie representing
a community and the color of each wedge indicating the parent standing or select committee
of the (sub)committees therein. More generally, it is desirable to study not only separate
communities in networks but also the overlap between such communities and what role that
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House Mean Standard Deviation Local Clustering Threshold
101st 8.9325 3.9785 0.1595
102nd 20.3558 5.1660 0.08095
103rd 17.0567 6.0884 0.09895
104th 10.8962 4.2537 0.1131
105th 7.4259 2.9425 0.1640
106th 46.5888 6.6118 0.04582
107th 11.7788 3.3746 0.1179
108th 8.8136 2.6212 0.1490
TABLE VII: Community sizes in the 101st–108th Houses at the organizational level determined
by the local clustering threshold value α that gives the highest maximum modularity. For each
Congress, we list the mean number of nodes, the standard deviation, and the value of α.
can play in the transfer of information and ideas. Such considerations have the potential
to be very interesting, as committees with strong ties to multiple communities may have a
substantial level of influence with otherwise disparate groups. While practically every study
of community structure in networks ignores community overlap a priori, a few researchers
have begun to scrutinize this feature (see, for example, [43]). The methods that have been
employed in such studies are different from those discussed here, but one can compute basic
statistics from the membership matrices to get some indication of community overlap. For
example, the mean community size in the 107th House at the organizational level that
gives the highest maximum modularity is 11.78 nodes and the standard deviation is 3.37
nodes. (The results from other Congresses are summarized in Table VII.) By comparison,
the set of communities at this organizational level (see Fig. 13) has only 8 communities,
giving an average community size of 113/8 ≈ 14.1 committees per community. The average
standing committee contains 113/21 ≈ 5.4 subcommittees (counting the parent committee).
Community sizes vary roughly with the threshold parameter α (which is selected to give the
highest maximum modularity), with smaller values of α typically yielding larger communities
by construction. Using the 107th House as an example, we can see from Table VII and the
combination of Figs. 7, 12, and 13 that this weighted local community detection seemingly
indicates a relatively small amount of overlap between the locally-defined communities.
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3. Direct comparison of dendrograms
In Table II, we list for each of our methods the maximum modularity obtained for a
single “cut” through the dendrogram and the average modularity over all possible cuts. A
cut signifies an organizational level of a dendrogram; we depict a cut graphically using a
concentric circular ring of the appropriate radius that divides inter-community links (those
outside the ring) from intra-community ones. See, for example, the dendrogram in Fig. 7 and
the resulting community-composition pie chart in Fig. 13. For the weighted local community
detection method, we used the values of the local clustering threshold α (denoted α1 , . . . , α8
for the 101st–108th Houses) giving the dendrograms with highest maximum modularity.
These values are given in Table VII. Similar modularity values are obtained over a relatively
broad range of α. To see the number of organizational levels revealed by each algorithm, we
list in Table VIII the maximum, mean, and standard deviation of the local Strahler numbers
for the dendrograms produced for each House. Observe, for example, that the weighted local
community detection method finds the largest number of organizational levels.
We compare dendrograms at the cuts (organizational levels) corresponding to their re-
spective maximum modularities. Table IX collects these comparisons across the different
clustering algorithms considered for each of the 101st–108th Houses. We compare the algo-
rithms in pairs, with each tabulated entry indicating the fraction of committee pairs classified
in the same manner by both methods (that is, both methods identify the committee pair as
belonging to the same community or both methods identify the pair as belonging to sepa-
rate communities). Although we list the results from specific maximum-modularity cuts in
Table IX, we obtained similar values over broad ranges of cuts in the dendrograms.
To illustrate these results, we compare the similarity scores in Table IX to the dendro-
grams for the 107th House produced using single linkage clustering (Fig. 5), betweenness-
based edge removal (Fig. 11), and our local community detection method (Fig. 7), as well
as the single linkage clustering dendrogram for the 108th House (Fig. 6). The maximum-
modularity cuts in these dendrograms have 28, 5, 8, and 25 communities, respectively.
Several observations are evident from Table IX. For example, the betweenness-based al-
gorithms produce results that are quantitatively similar to each other but in general less
similar to the other two methods. The weighted local clustering method and single linkage
clustering likewise produce similar community structures.
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Method: SL EB NB WL
S1 , S˜1 , Sσ1 4 , 3.289 , 0.758 3 , 2.516 , 0.501 4 , 2.786 , 0.799 5 , 4.638 , 0.552
S2 , S˜2 , Sσ2 4 , 3.203 , 0.686 4 , 2.620 , 0.669 3 , 2.350 , 0.478 5 , 4.522 , 0.695
S3 , S˜3 , Sσ3 4 , 3.362 , 0.679 4 , 3.064 , 0.872 3 , 2.582 , 0.495 5 , 4.567 , 0.645
S4 , S˜4 , Sσ4 5 , 4.547 , 0.770 3 , 2.613 , 0.489 3 , 2.604 , 0.491 5 , 4.368 , 0.588
S5 , S˜5 , Sσ5 5 , 3.880 , 0.924 3 , 2.546 , 0.500 3 , 2.500 , 0.502 5 , 4.639 , 0.585
S6 , S˜6 , Sσ6 4 , 3.626 , 0.575 4 , 3.393 , 0.491 3 , 2.486 , 0.502 5 , 4.243 , 0.609
S7 , S˜7 , Sσ7 5 , 4.089 , 0.819 4 , 2.779 , 0.799 3 , 2.575 , 0.497 5 , 4.699 , 0.459
S8 , S˜8 , Sσ8 5 , 4.509 , 0.767 3 , 2.466 , 0.499 3 , 2.492 , 0.500 5 , 4.254 , 0.666
TABLE VIII: Horton-Strahler numbers (Si), mean local Horton-Strahler numbers (S˜i), and the
standard deviation (σi) of the local Horton-Strahler numbers for the 101st–108th Houses (i = 1
denotes the 101st House of Representatives, etc.), with dendrograms produced using single linkage
clustering (SL), random-walk betweenness with sequential edge (committee assignment) removal
(EB), random-walk betweenness with sequential Representative node removal (NB), and a weighted
generalization (WL) of the local community detection method of [3] with the α values that give
the highest maximum modularity.
Even when the quantitative measure of community similarity at the preferred cuts is low,
many committees of interest nevertheless get grouped similarly in dendrograms produced
from multiple methods, suggesting that the observed close ties between these committees
are properties of the networks themselves rather than of the algorithms used. For example,
the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the 107th House is grouped with the Rules
Committee and its subcommittees using single linkage clustering (Fig. 5), the weighted
local community determination method (Fig. 7), and the edge-betweenness based method
(Fig. 11). One can also see that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
its subcommittees are grouped together by all three algorithms. The recurrence of such
groupings in the dendrograms, and in the visualizations of Figs. 2–4, further supports the
31
House WL vs SL WL vs EB WL vs NB SL vs EB SL vs NB EB vs NB
101st 0.8056 0.9123 0.7813 0.7630 0.6077 0.7613
102nd 0.8349 0.4876 0.5837 0.3988 0.5000 0.8306
103rd 0.7896 0.5463 0.7046 0.4751 0.6301 0.7289
104th 0.8794 0.6961 0.7191 0.6453 0.6855 0.8767
105th 0.8927 0.6433 0.4962 0.6274 0.4886 0.8221
106th 0.7907 0.6762 0.6662 0.6708 0.5860 0.7988
107th 0.8685 0.6775 0.5397 0.6841 0.5653 0.8274
108th 0.8893 0.6975 0.5950 0.6407 0.5196 0.7876
TABLE IX: Comparison of House community structure as identified using different algorithms for
the 101st–108th Congresses. The numbers indicate the fraction of leaf pairs identified in the same
manner in pairwise comparisons of single linkage clustering (SL), edge betweenness (EB), node be-
tweenness (NB), and the weighted local community detection method with maximum modularity
(WL). Leaf pairs are identified in the same manner in two dendrograms if, at a given organi-
zational level, both dendrograms place them in the same subtree or both place them in different
subtrees. For each House, we use the organizational level identified as having the highest maximum
modularity. We obtain similar comparison values over broad ranges of cuts in the dendrograms.
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FIG. 7: (Color) Dendrogram of the committee assignment network for the 107th U.S. House of
Representatives, determined using the weighted local community detection method (discussed in
Appendix B) with local clustering threshold α ≈ 0.1179. This value of α gives the dendrogram with
highest maximum modularity, as indicated by the dashed dividing ring. The dendrogram is color-
coded according to the number of hierarchical levels of each community in the tree, which is codified
by Horton-Strahler numbers (discussed in the text). The Strahler numbers of the communities are
calculated as one moves from the outside to the center of the tree. When two nodes of Strahler
number 1 (dark blue) combine, they form a community with Strahler number 2 (light blue). We
also find communities with Strahler numbers of 3 (green), 4 (orange), and 5 (maroon), indicating
the five hierarchical levels in the committee assignment network of the 107th House.
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FIG. 8: (Color) Singular value decomposition (SVD) of the Senate voting record from the 107th
U.S. Congress. (a) Two-dimensional projection of the voting matrix. Each point represents a
projection of a single Representative’s votes onto the leading two eigenvectors (labeled “partisan”
and “bipartisan,” as explained in the text). Democrats (blue) appear on the left and Republicans
(red) are on the right. (Independents are shown in green). (b) “Predictability” of votes cast by
Senators in the 107th Congress based on a two-dimensional projection of the SVD. Individual
Senators range from 74% predictable to 97% predictable.
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FIG. 9: (Color) SVD of the voting record for the House of Representatives for each of the 102nd–
107th U.S. Congresses. As with the Senate, Democrats (blue) appear on the left and Republicans
(red) are on the right (with Independents shown in green).
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FIG. 10: (Color) SVD of the roll call of the 107th House projected onto the voting coordinates.
Points represent projections of the votes cast on a measure onto eigenvectors associated with the
leading two singular values. There is a clear separation between measures that passed (green) and
those that did not (red). The four corners of the plot are interpreted as follows: measures with
broad bipartisan support (north) all passed; those supported mostly by the Right (east) passed
because the Republicans constituted the majority party of the 107th House; measures supported by
the Left (west) failed because of the Democratic minority; and the (obviously) very few measures
supported by almost nobody (south) also failed.
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FIG. 11: (Color) Dendrogram of the committees of the 107th U.S. House of Representatives con-
structed by sequentially removing individual committee assignments with highest random-walk
betweenness (and subsequently recomputing betweenness). Committees are listed counterclock-
wise around the outside of the figure in the order in which the algorithm separates them from the
largest network component. Committees and groups of committees are again color-coded accord-
ing to their mean extremisms. The first group of separated committees (just to the left of the 12
o’clock position) includes the Rules Committee and Select Committee on Homeland Security; this
algorithm again indicates their close connection.
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FIG. 12: (Color) Visualization of the unsorted (a) and sorted (b) membership matrices for the
107th House. The colors indicate the nearly full blocks of value 1 along the diagonal and the
mostly zero-valued entries that are near the diagonal but outside of these blocks.
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FIG. 13: (Color) Pie chart of the 107th House at the modularity-maximizing organizational level
indicated by the dashed dividing ring in Fig. 7. Each pie represents a community and has wedges
colored by the parent standing and select committees of the (sub)committees present in that
community. The size of a wedge is determined by the number of (sub)committees it contains.
Only connections between different communities are depicted (with thicker lines indicating stronger
connections); the intra-community edges are not visible at this level of organization.
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